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Abstract 
The new European economy, complete with monetary union, gave rise to the emergence of a New European 
Economic Policy (NEEP). This paper takes as its task the analysis of: i) forms of the European Union elaborating on 
some of the specifics of the NEEP; ii) the problems the new European economy has which demand huge reforms: low 
employment rate, the rigidity of the labor market, non-competition in product and service markets, slowing of  process 
of convergence with American levels, differences in living-standards, ageing and globalization; iii) the elements of the 
NEEP: Common policies such as those on competition, trade and agriculture, the program of pro-competitive 
structural reforms, monetary policy, and the coordination of economic and employment policies of the Member States; 
iv) European policy mix and its high performance except in regard to reforming economies of old Europe. The 
structural tendencies of the European economy need to be considerably more competitive. While maintaining this 
policy mix, reformations of the economic institutions need to be realized by linking Europe, competition and 
solidarity. 
 
JEL  E61, F15, N24. 
Keywords: European Economy, Economic Policy, Structural Reforms, European Integration, Europe. 
 
La nouvelle économie et l’union monétaire de l’Europe pressent au déroulement d’une Nouvelle politique économique 
européenne (NEEP). Dans ce papier nous analysons:  i) les formes de l’Union européenne qui expliquent certaines 
spécificités de la NEEP; ii) les problèmes de l’économie européenne qui demandent des réformes urgentes : taux d’emploi 
réduits, rigidité dans les marchés de travail et les salaires, absence de concurrence dans les marchés de facteurs et de 
produits, fin du procès de convergence vers les niveaux américains, écarts dans les niveaux de vie et les standards de 
consommation, vieillissement et globalisation; iii) les éléments qui composent la NEEP : les politiques communes comme 
celle de la concurrence, commerciale et agricole, les programmes de réformes structurelles pro-compétitives, la politique 
monétaire, ainsi que la coordination des politiques-économiques et d’emploi des États membres; et iv) les performances du 
policy mix européen, bonnes sauf en ce qui concerne aux réformes dont la vieille Europe a besoin. Pour surmonter plusieurs 
graves tendances structurelles de l‘économie européenne il convient de la rendre plus compétitive. Pour aboutir aux réformes 
écono9miques il faut établir un lien solide et brillant entre l’Europe, la concurrence et la solidarité. 
 
     
 
A new European economic policy (NEEP) is in development. The analysis of this process is organized into four 
sections. Firstly, we profile the new European situation, in which 27 Member States (MS) constitute a European Union 
(EU) centred around values of peace, freedom, democracy, market economy, competition, welfare and social 
inclusion, while operating with special forms and of course the ensuing democratic, social and administrative deficits.  
Secondly, we analyse the new European economy (EE) currently in formation, presenting the major differences 
between the old western states, the new eastern states and the territories in between, in which regulations are recurrent, 
competition is limited and social services for pensions, health and education takes up one-third of the income. The 
European catching-up process with American levels stopped a decade ago and the gap between respective living-
standards is growing. The EU average employment rate is ten points under that of the American, and productivity is 
static. Aging, deindustrialization, globalization, delocation, immobility of workers, inflexibility of salaries, profusion 
of public regulations are the most daunting external, sociological and ideological challenges. 
Thirdly, discussion of the development of a new European economic policy: from out of the monetary union, 
European monetary policy hastens the coordination of economic and employment policies. Growth, employment, price 
stabilization, sustainability of public finances are cultivated by limiting deficits. There are four sources for the NEEP: 
Community policies, through which are distinguished competition, regional and agricultural policies; the Lisbon 
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strategy, for structural reforms that enlarge employment by promoting competition in factor, product and service 
markets in a new and open economy based on information technologies; European monetary policy; and the 
coordination of economic and employment policies. 
Fourthly, the analysis of the performance and limitations of the new EE and the NEEP. Europe is more stable, 
nevertheless is growing at a slower pace. Currently, employment is growing but productivity is slowing. Pro-
competitive reforms (despite an overwhelming consensus that the EE urgently needs them) have been stalled, more 
precisely in the bigger nations of the Union. The current European policy mix is performing well, though the slightest 
sneeze from America could wipe out the European twin surpluses. This is essential for a commencing policy in a 
complex Europe that as of yet has not the means required of a powerful new economy and its common political and 
social ambitions. But the structural dynamics of Europe need to be accompanied, counterbalanced, and its impacts 
anticipated by substantial economy reforms which its governments are incapable of instigating. A link between the EU 
and its policies, ineluctable competition and interpersonal/interstate solidarity should be more conducive to applying 
these structural reforms.  
 
 
 
I. The New European Economy 
 
The NEEP being developed together by the EU and by its MS. The NEEP respond to the new EE and to new 
economic policy orientations.  
 
A.  An European Economy in formation 
The EU is now comprised of 27 MS: the 6 founder MS, the 9 more recently joined MS from Western Europe 
forming with the first the EU15, and the 12 MS joined in 2004 and 2007, 10 of them former socialist countries. Thus 
the first threat of the EE is diversity. There are MS of all sizes and in all kinds of conditions. 6 of them are big 
countries, from 80 to 40 millions inhabitants: Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Some MS 
are medium countries e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium or Sweden. A lot of MS are small e.g. Denmark, Ireland or the 
Czech Republic, and some MS are little countries e.g. Luxemburg, Cyprus or Malta. Naturally the conditions, abilities, 
activities and performances are quite different, divergent, and complimentary. Sometimes they are seemingly-
incompatible in their historical, cultural, political, sociological, and economic aspects, and sometimes they are in 
opposition.  
This is precisely the value of the EU: a common civilization and contemporary union of the diverse, the search for 
peace and gentle neighborhoods, common freedom and development. Unanimity, law, gradualism and the economy 
are the principles of the EU’s path.  
The EU law, the primary law established in the Treaties and the deriving law produced by the EU institutions, 
always prevails. The so-called Common, Community or European policies are usually just that for every MS, 
sometimes with some regional adjustments. This is the case for the Common Market, and thus for the competition 
rules, foreign commercial policy, and for some special common policies developed by the EU institutions, namely the 
Council of the Union, the European Commission (EC), and the European Parliament.  
From 1986 the Common Market was turned into an Unique Market, enforcing competition policy and extending it 
to all service activities. From 1999 some of the EU MS formed a monetary union. Today 13 MS are in the euro area 
(€A). But diversity in the EU is higher than in the United States (US) and the integration quite less advanced.  
Democracy and the rule of law, as well as private property and market orientation prevail in all the EU MS. But 
there are different traditions even in its contemporary There are two poles in considering the EE: advanced economies, 
with high productivity applied to mass consumption and high social protection in old Western Europe, and developing 
economies in transition in new Central and Eastern Europe. But in the old EU different sensibilities exist related to 
economic and policies. There are the Nordic States, with more social-democratic models and in which the small 
countries perform highly using flexicurity.
1 (Karl Aiginger, 2005; Wolfgang Streek and Christine Trampusch, 2005) 
In continental MS such as France and Germany the socio-economic model is based on a labor market more 
paternalist and regulated and in a State-oriented fashion. The Mediterranean socioeconomic model is the most 
regulated: Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain have the largest and most persistent MS regulations in the markets of 
products and services, and in the labor market of course. (OECD, 2002 and 2007a).The United Kingdom and Ireland 
are the liberal exceptions to the European panorama, with a more pro-competitive socioeconomic model orientation, 
even though social expenditures in education, health and pensions surpass one third of the GDP, as in the rest of the 
EU15. With all of this, a European economy is in formation: first by the common market, labor mobility, capital 
circulation, and monetary integration; second by policy coordination between MS and its integration in the EU. 
Activities and forms, performances and relations are grow more commonly European. (EC-DG Ecofin, 2006). 
The benefits of economic integration are made evident by researchers from Bela Balassa to Paul Krugman. 
European economic integration produces a large domestic market, and thus greater efficiency, productivity, and 
                                                 
1 The neologism flexisecurity  or flexicurity combines the flexibility for employers with the security for employee, the 
liberty of employment with the protection of workers. (On flexicurity see below the table 6 and in the Appendix the 
table D.) 
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competitiveness (ECB, 2006) But some deriving problems exist also, solvable by the benefits of the integration 
process. 
2  
 
B.   The Dynamics of the European Economy 
Europe is living a new life. After World War II in Western Europe a boom was produced during the fifties and the 
sixties in economics, politics and social matters. The EU15 growth of GDP surpassed 10 per cent some years in the 
sixties. In decomposing the GDP growth in employment growth and in productivity growth most of the European GDP 
appears as due to the productivity growth. (Robert J. Gordon, 2006; and Andrew Sharpe) Inversely in the US the GDP 
growth is due to the employment growth. In figure 1 GDP is depicted as a saw, employment as columns and 
productivity as a curve: in the US case the saws are explained by the columns.  
The dynamic profiles of the EU and the US are quite different: America grows through employment and 
productivity, Europe through productivity. Certainly the US was an employment-creating machine. Behind the 
different profiles a process of economic convergence appears, Europe had been catching up with the US. Thus 
European growth was higher in spite of the scant employment created. Investment rates were also considerable in 
Europe. But the American evolution shows the European future: the scissors between decreased investment and the 
increasing unemployment. All in all, the contemporary European economic dynamic has passed through these phases:   
I.  The European miracle 1960-1973. 
II.  The de-industrialization crisis 1973-1985.  
III.  The recovering 1985-1995. 
IV.  The new economy growth 1995-2005.  
                                                 
2 This is the basis of common interventions: to compensate punctually with part of the global benefits the integration should 
produce.  
Figure 1 
 
Trends in American and European Growth:  
GDP, Employment, and Productivity 
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But the European catching-up process halted in 1995. Thus this is the major question on European economic 
dynamics and economic policy. Reasons explaining this hiatus in the convergence process of the EE to American 
levels: 
I.  The maturity of the growth process in which the quantitative changes have less impact and in which qualitative 
changes are required to maintain the earlier high growth rates. (Karl Aiginger, 2004). 
II.  The lessened capacity of the EE to profit from the so-called New Economy based on:  
•  The new technological paradigm mixing electronics and information, diffusing the use of computers into all 
activities, and opening new fields in the use of biological advancements. (Martin Neil Baily and Jacob Funk 
Kirkegaard, 2004) 
•  The privatization of the economy, reducing public enterprises, public subsidies, and public regulations. 
(OECD, 2007a) 
•  The globalization of activities, enlarging the size of productions, opening new markets, reducing frontiers, 
producing cheaply on a world scale (Richard Florida, 2002; and Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli, 2004) . 
III.  The less competitive orientation of the European economy. (Olaf Gersemann, 2004) 
IV.  The integration economy gap, limiting the size and the competitiveness of the market, called the cost of non-
Europe. (Tomasso Padoa Schioppa, dir., 1987 and EC-DG Ecofin, many years) 
 
Thus the big problem is not the productivity gap but the living standard gap. In  other words advanced economies 
share a broadly similar production frontier (John Kay, 2005), or they can share a similar productivity. 
3 
 
C.  Problems of the New European Economy 
The NEE is historically an important result in point of view of the political equilibrium it shows, of the economic 
performance it produces, and of the social cohesion it generates. But there are two mixed problems: i) the immediate 
differences between what the EE is and what it should be, and ii) the present and future structural problems derived 
from its condition, that of mature economy. The EE should perform more easily if some policies and structural reforms 
are introduced. The size of the future problems depends from the current structural problems and by the delay in 
introducing the reforms needed. The current structural problems of the EE can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
3 See table A in the Appendix for an estimation of the costs of the gaps, the elements contributing to explain the Europe/America 
gaps. 
 
Table 1 
 
Elements of the Socio-economic European Model 
and Pillars of the European Economy 
 
A. Developed Economy  B. Rule of Law 
 
C. Welfare State 
 
acquired in EU15, 
 in formation in other MS 
 
C.1. Employment and Labour 
Market Protection 
Contracts, bargaining, and layoff 
 Pensions 
 
 
C.2. Social Services  SSS 
Health 
A.1. Advanced Economy (EU 15) 
 
High productivity,  High material 
and energy consumptions,  
Competition,  Efficiency, Equity,  
Free foreign trade, Mass 
production for mass consumption 
 
A.2. Transition Economy  
(almost 10 new MS of the EU 27) 
High growth, Economic 
convergence, Privatization 
B.1. Political Freedom 
 
Representation and democracy, 
Power separation, 
Personal rights: from liberties 
 to social services, 
Justice, Security 
Liberté, égalité, fraternité 
 
 
B.2. Economic Freedom 
Limited regulation, Law security, 
Transparency, No corruption 
           Education 
 
C.3. Social policies 
Fiscal redistribution, 
Cohesion: family, housing, 
integration, Compensatory and 
active social policies, Income 
guarantee 
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I. The gap between the European and the American levels of productivity
4: the gap was reduced from 9% in 1990 
to 18 % in 2006 (see the figure 2). From a historical perspective, European productivity caught up with American 
productivity in the nineties and fell afterwards. (Robert J. Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker, 2005) 
II. The gap between European and the American standard of living
5: in 1990 the European GDP per capita was 
75% of the American, in 2006 it was 71%. From a historical perspective, the European living-standard maintained this 
gap relative to the American, despite the important growth in productivity. Europe is not applying the growth of 
productivity to living-standard. 
III. The European gap between productivity and living-standard: From a historical perspective the two curves 
produce an ‘X’. This gap was inverted in the early seventies and then enlarged. Relative to the American, European 
productivity grew until the nineties but the living-standard planed out. If not to living-standard, to where did these 
productivity increases go? 
IV. The halting of the convergence and catching-up process between the European and the American economies 
from 1990. 
V. The gaps existing between MS in productivity and especially in living-standard. The European convergence 
process between MS appears to have stopped. 
 
Analyses of the EE dynamics and structure are unanimous and conclusive. Europe suffers from : 
I. A low utilization of the labor force. This is due to an exiguous employment rate. The European employment rate is 
less than 65,5% while the American surpasses  72% (see the figure 3 and EC. DG Employment, 2006: 21). This is the 
key problem. This little employment rate explains both the European productivity difference from America and the 
European gap between productivity and living-standard. In MS the employment rate varies: the Mediterranean 
countries as France, Italy, and especially Spain, Portugal and Greece have the lowest employment rate of the EU15.In 
the new MS the employment rate was higher in the past, 
but in the current transition phase is falling below the 
EU15 average.  
II. Labor force rigidity, producing extreme immobility,
6 
an inflexibility of wages in the economic situation and 
sector productivity dynamics. Inflation and the general 
productivity clause are the primary elements in 
bargaining. (R. Schettkat, 2003) 
III. A deficit of competition and over-regulation. Not 
just factor markets, product and service markets had   
restricted accessibility. The over-regulation of activities is 
a European speciality. Nevertheless some progresses in 
deregulating were produced in the last decades. (OECD, 
2002, 2003 and 2007a) 
IV. A deficit in technological investments and in high-
tech productions. The new knowledge economy and 
competitiveness works together (Maria Joao Rodrigues, 
ed,  2003 and 2004). 
                                                 
4 Productivity can be analysed by GDP per employed and by GDP per worked hour. (OECD, 2003) 
5 Living-standard can be analysed by GDP per capita. (Ibid.) 
6 Only 1,6% of the EU15 population is living in a MS different from their national MS. (Ferran Brunet, 1999 and 2006b). 
Figure 2 
 
Economic Convergence Process: 
The European Catching-Up of America 
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D.  The European Sources of Growth 
Vectors of Economic Policy, and the Benefits of Structural Reforms 
 
What are the EU’s sources of growth? The EU is composed of two groups of countries: the advanced economies 
forming the EU15 and the rest, the transitional economies. For these latter countries growth depends largely on their 
incardination in the EE, in particular on the investments they can attract from EU15, US, Japan and other developed 
countries.  
For the developed EU15 MS the growth questions (as we can see in figures 1, 2 and 3) are: i) to enlarge the 
employment rate, especially in some MS; ii) to enlarge the EE productivity; and iii) to reduce public regulation. 
Basically the EP in EU15 should be oriented to produce economic reform, structural reforms, or regulatory reform; 
 
Figure 3 
 
The European Economy: Structural Dynamics 
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deregulation, liberalization; structural policies, specific, micro or offer policies; and institutional reforms or 
institutional arrangements. Invariably these consist in reducing the level of regulation, the constraints introduced in the 
past by public and administrative bodies. There is unanimity in the diagnosis (the productivity gap and the living 
standard gap) and unanimity in the remedy, that by the name of the Paris Consensus.
7 
Industry is just as productive in the EU15 as in the US. What’s the difference? The difference is the employment rate, 
productivity in some service activities, and regulation and income redistribution resulting in the lower European 
living-standard. In other words, in a global world in which capital and technology can flow freely, institutional 
arrangements,  orientation in economic policy, and the way the socio-economic model operates all create the 
differences between countries of similar capacities. (Alan Ahearne et alii, 2007). 
 
 Thus responding to the OECD (2003) question on what should be the sources of growth, it is clear for Europe: 
I. Productivity: To enlarge productivity in economic activities in the EU, especially in certain MS and certain 
industries.  
II. Employment: Enlarging the labor force, favoring new employment reducing the gap with the American and 
Japanese employment rate. To do this three contingents targeted: young people, women, and workers aged 55 and 
over. The main objective is to enlarge the average hours worked a year by worker or halting its reduction. 
III. Structural Reforms: The economic reforms reduce the public regulation and enlarge the competition in the 
economic system. This is the main instrument.  
IV. Globalization: Firstly,  completing EU integration; secondly, establishing a free trade area between EU and US, 
and finally progressing toward openness.      
 
 
E.  The Costs of the EE Imbalance and the Benefits of the NEEP 
The imbalances of the EE we can summarize in a reduced employment rate, the fruit of a non-competitive policy 
developed over a long time. But in another sense, the obstacles to growth are the sources of growth. The costs for the 
EE can be the benefits Europe may obtain by applying structural policies reforming institutions and structures in a pro-
competitive way. These are the items of problems/solutions for the EE, and the costs/benefits of the EEP (see the table 
A in the Appendix): 
I.  A. The use of Labor. The labor use gap is the biggest gap between the European and American economies. It is 
recognized as the greatest limitation of the EE. The main aspect is that the European employment rate is 6% lower 
than the American, and the cost/benefit of this in terms of GDP you can estimate. The second aspect of this 
underuse of labor in EU is the shorter working hours, estimated as 15%. Altogether the aspects related to the use 
of labor makes up 20% of the GDP, explaining most of the living-standard gap with the US.  
II.  We can contrast these items comparing the unemployment rate with the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) and the potential GDP as in the panels B and C of the figure 3. The gap between 
potential GDP, obtained with the help of the NAIRU, and the  current  GDP  is of an average of 2%. In another 
sense we can consider the funds applied to compensate unemployed persons, usually 2% GDP.  The total 
cost/benefit of the underuse of labor should be 16% GDP.   
III.  Less Productivity. The productivity gap between the European and the American economies is 14% of the GDP 
per hour worked.
8 Overregulation, the limitations to economic freedom, and the non-market practices are the 
components of this cost. The introduction of more competition by deregulation and pro-competitive policies 
should reduce this cost. 
IV.  Structural Reforms. The Lisbon Strategy is EU EP (see below) which mixes structural reforms and competition, 
thus enlarges the employment rate and the investments in research and technology. The direct cost of non-Lisbon 
is estimated to be 0,75%  of the GDP. (EC- DG Ecofin, 2005) 
V.  Opened economy. To finish the openness of the European economy can enlarge in 5 per cent the GDP per capita. 
Some of the benefits results of completing the European integration process. A free trade area between US and 
EU should produce around 1 per cent of GDP increase. Another 3 per cent is coming from globalization.  
VI.  Equilibrated economy. Ten per cent of the GDP flows by disequilibria and disorders in economy, politics and 
society. The regulatory reform and the rule of law are important sources of growth for the EE.                                                     
  The European gap between productivity and living standard should be explained by some of these elements. 
                                                 
7 According to Karl Aiginger (2004), following the Washington Consensus. Surely a Decalogue can be obtained from this 
unanimity both in the analysis and in the policies. 
8  OECD compendium of productivity indicators   8
 
II. The New European Union 
A new EU is appearing: United in democracy and welfare are close to five hundred million European citizens. 
Freedom in politics, competition in economics, solidarity in society. But the division of enemy systems and the 
common rule of law, the suppression of frontiers and the liberty of movement for people, commodities and capital, the 
highly productive mass-consumption economy, even the monetary union,  are not guaranteed. In economy there some 
important risks: the dependence on oil, the delocation of 
production. In society, the low employment rate, the aging, some 
ideological tendencies to corporatism, paternalism. In politics, 
the disintegration of some modern European states, the crisis of 
the elites. Bigger, more complex, this EU does not have the 
means to realize its own ambitions. The risk of this new EU is to 
die from its own success. 
 
A. From Common Market to European Union 
Peace, non-discrimination by nationality and free 
movements of merchandises, workers, capitals and services to 
competition, monetary union and political union, these are the 
mains steps the European Community history follows. This is a 
successful story. All the elements were favorably disposed: i) in 
economy, a miracle developed mass-production and 
consumption, limiting contradictions, enlarging wellbeing; ii) 
the failure of nazism, communism and totalitarianism, the 
triumph of liberty and democracy, and iii) the development of 
the European Economic Community in a European Union, 
enlarging the MS from 6 to 27, unifying Europe through the rule 
of law, and intensifying Community competences and policies in 
an emerging federal state form. 
In point of view of law, the journey from a Common market 
to the European Union is paved by the important juridical acts:  
•  The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1951-2), because it was the first, and a 
successful one. 
•   The treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(TEEC, 1956-7), because of it, the generalization of the 
common Market was possible. 
•  The Single European Act (SEA, 1986-7), because  it 
reforms the Rome treaty it transforms the Common Market 
into an Internal Market extending competition policy to 
services – two-thirds of the GDP - and it introduced the 
regional cohesion policy and structural funds. (Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, dir., 1987) 
•  The treaty establishing the EU (TUE, 1991-3), because it 
introduced political unity and the monetary union. 
The enlargements attest to the different EU changes. The 
first enlargement was the consolidation of the EEC as an 
integrative way. The second and the third opened the integration process to West European Mediterranean 
countries. The fourth supposes the final task of West Europe integration. The fifth and the sixth suppose the 
overlapping of European division by systems. 
  In point of view of the common policies, there are five distinguished events
9: 
•  1952-1957: the introduction of the Common Market. 
•  1962: the introduction of CAP. 
•  1972: the introduction of the European Monetary System. 
•  1986: the Structural funds development. 
•  1999: the introduction of the EMU. 
A dialectic between intensification of common policies and the enlargement of the EU appears. In most open 
communities, this dialectic is common and has a positive solution impelling and favoring both aspects.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See below table 7. 
Figure 4 
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B. Towards a European Monetary Union and a European Economic Policy 
 
The EMU is a result of the EU treaty. It is a political decision, introducing a qualitative change in the EU 
development. The EMU imposes a common EP. After the EMU, in the preparatory phase 1992-1999 the Maastricht 
financial criteria were followed to converge in monetary conditions favoring the EMU. In point of view of monetary 
policy –the main EP policy- the development of a EEP had the following four phases:  
I. 1952-1972. Where the monetary policy and by extension the policy mix had no explicit coordination. 
II. 1972-1991. Where an common exchange rate floating system so-called European Monetary System (EMS) was 
established. Managed as a interstate cooperation of some MS central banks the EMS had three instruments: the 
fixed and revisable parities, with a floating band of +/- 1,25 / 6%; the mechanism of obliged intervention by central 
banks; and the European Currency Unit (ecu) successor of the European Monetary Unit, a charter composite virtual 
monetary unit). 
III. 1992-1999. This is the monetary convergence phase in which, following EU gradualism, the MS practiced EP 
tending to satisfy the Maastricht criteria (see table 2). This phase begins with great financial market speculation 
against the currencies of the MS with more difficulty in approving the Maastricht treaty as well as Denmark and 
France and the MS for whom it would be more difficult to satisfy the Maastricht criteria, as well as Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Italy. This produces more financial instability and three realignments in the EMS parities, plus the 
enlarging of floating band by +/- 15%. But the economic dynamics turned (see the figure 1) to favor this project of 
monetary union. Thus this phase ended with an important success: ten candidates MS formed the European   
Monetary Union (EMU). 
IV. 1999-. The EMU changed the nature of the EU EP, and of the entire EU. The EMU needed to be managed, the 
EMU needed a monetary policy to be established and developed. The answer was the foundation of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
After the EMU, the necessity to reinforce the EEP was inescapable. Two new EU policies will appear: i) the 
monetary policy, following price stability criteria; and ii) the coordination of MS EP with the new EU EP, following a 
sustainability criteria. These new policies will interact with the current common EU policies, the Lisbon Strategy for 
structural reforms, and with the MS policies. Altogether they will conform to the new EEP. 
 
C. The Elements of European Policies 
 
The EEP is a composite, a sum of a lot of determinations. It does not correspond to one programmatic vision 
so much as to an accumulation of objectives and initiatives. The sources of the EEP are: 
 
I. The current policies of the EU. The constitutive treaties establishes  a common market for coal and iron –by the 
first treaty establishing a Community-,  a general common market for all goods –by the treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community-, a common market for nuclear combustible and energy –by the treaty establishing an 
ad hoc Community-. In 1986 -by the SEA- the Common Market was extended to services.  
On this foundation the EU developed the following policies: commercial, competition, agriculture, industry, 
technology, transports,  regional, social, and environmental. The main orientation is sector or microeconomic. (For the 
Community policies see Figure 2, left column.) The EUA introduced a big change, after which the Community was 
pushed towards a new pro-competitive phase. From this moment a second life for competition policy began. The 
Common Market was renamed Unique Market to underline the new way of mutual recognition of its proceeds and 
product rules.  
 
II. Structural Reforms Policy. This important new policy was introduced in the EU in 2000. A basement in the 
Common Competition policy can be observed, but his purpose is even more general: to reform the economy,  to 
liberalize the economic relations, deregulating most of them and introducing more quality in the regulations. (For the 
EU structural reforms policy see figure 2, second column.) 
 
III. Monetary Policy. Developed from the treaty establishing the European Union or Maastricht treaty, a EU monetary 
policy is acting and from this the necessity of  a NEEP appears. A long way has been traveled to the European 
Monetary Union (1999) as we’ll now see. (For the EU monetary policy see figure 2, third column.) 
 
IV. Coordination in Economic and Employment Policies. There are three fields to coordinate in: i) the different EU 
EP, ii) the EU EP with EU Employment and social policies, iii) the EU EP with MS EP. This last aspect is the most 
important part of EU coordination policy. This policy can be considered a horizontal action. It’s developed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact and by the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. (For the Coordination of Policies see figure 
2, third column.) 
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V. EP developed directly by the MS themselves. The MS manages most of the EP: fiscal, broad economic regulation 
of activities, enterprise rules, social policies, and all actions related to sovereignty competences. (For the MS EP, see 
in figure 2 the right column.) 
 
III. Implementing the New European Economic Policy 
 
The New European Economic Policy (NEEP) is the result of the actions of the European Union related to the 
economic activities, consisting in: i) the Community Policies usual on trade, competition, industry, or regions; ii) the 
structural reforms consolidated as Lisbon Strategy; iii) the monetary policy developed by the ECB; and iv) the 
coordination in policies. Additionally two other types of decisions form the NEEP: i) the regulations affecting the 
economic activities produced by the Parliament, the Commission and the Council in matters of activity, process, or 
product  specifications; and ii) the regulations produced by the MS authorities that mix with the Community EP and 
thus produce together the NEEP. In this section the first four of these regulations will be considered. 
 
A. The Community Policies 
The policies developed by the European Union come from the first Community, a Common Market of  coal and 
iron. After the first treaty a general Common Market was essayed by the Rome treaty, establishing the European 
Economic Community today the European Community. Thus this large treaty had always been considered a 
Constitutional treaty. All common policies and actions are to apply the principle of non-discrimination by nationality 
or equal treatment and its corollary, the four liberties of movements. 
 In suppressing the internal tariff frontiers two policies appears logically: the management of the new common 
external frontier, e.g. first of all, commercial policy and the management of the new common market. 
I. Trade and foreign policies. From 1967 a unique tariff was applied. Foreign trade grew considerably but production 
level declined. Until the EMU in 1999 the EU had no common currency serving commercial purposes. Even with the 
euro, the exchange couldn’t be used as a complementary commercial instrument due to the hegemony of the dollar and 
its unilateral movements (see the Panel F at the figure A below in the Appendix). Nevertheless the commercial sheet 
surplus of the EU shows a competitiveness greater than expected (see the Panel E at ibidem). 
 
II. Competition policy. This horizontal policy results from the second liberty. It affected all industrial sectors until 
1986. According to the Single European Act treaty (SEA), competition policy was extended to services. The EU 
developed to a thorough degree its competition in services and this was an important source of growth during the 
1990’s. (EC, many years). 
  Figure 5 
 
The European Union Policies: The Concentric Circles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal Principle Treatment: non discrimination by 
nationality. 
Four liberties: persons, commodities, capital, and 
services. 
Community Policies 
Trade 
Competition 
Internal: Energy, Industry, Technology, 
Transport, Environment, and Consumer. 
Regional  cohesion 
Social 
Security & Justice Affairs 
Structural Reforms 
Monetary policy 
Coordination of Economic (and Employment) Policies: 
Stability, Growth, Multilateral surveillance of public 
finance sustainability 
 
 
 
Equal
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III.  Internal Policies: Energy, Industry, Technology, 
Transport, Environment and other internal policies. 
There are a lot of actions related to incidental problems 
creating a Industrial Strategy (European Parliament. DG 
for Research, 2007). Even with a Community for iron 
and coal and another for nuclear, European energy 
policy was not developed and the oil was managed 
outside EU policies. In fact, the common market in all 
sectors and  competition policy is the main industrial 
policy of the  EU. Probably the Lisbon Strategy (see 
below) and the European subsidized projects on 
technology the regional and cohesion policy should 
serve the competitiveness of the EE. 
 
IV.  Agriculture Policy. The Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) is the European policy with the largest 
budgetary impact. There was no doubt as to the main 
Community policy: the CAP was the way to finance the 
revolution that occurred in the European agriculture 
during the last five decades. Productivity was multiplied 
using intensively industrial inputs as machinery, oil,  and 
fertilizers. The CAP supposes 40 per cent of the EU 
budget, 40,000 M € per year, 0.4 per cent of the EU 
GDP.
10 From 2003 the decoupling introduced between 
the production and the subsidies the farmer receives can 
favor the final dismantling of the CAP in the next 
financial period 2013-2019. (Eurostat, 2006a) 
 
V. Regional Policy. The Cohesion Policy is the EU’s 
way of reducing the territorial income differences. 
Developed in the late 1980’s after the enlargement of 
differences between the MS due to the accession of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland and of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, regional policy co-financed public 
investments in selected areas of the EU, usually 
infrastructure. These so-called structural funds represent 
one third of the EU budget, 40,000 M € per year, 0.4 per 
cent of the EU GDP. (European Court of Auditors, 
2006.)  
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements with twelve new MS 
with incomes well under the EU average obliged an 
important remake of regional policy, to the detriment of 
the old Mediterranean MS. The Lisbon Strategy for 
structural reforms introduced a pro-competitive 
orientation in regional EU policy. (EC-DG Regional 
Policy, 2004)  
 
VI. Social Policies.  European social actions turn on  the 
first liberty of free movement of MS citizens. Thus the 
coordination of social security systems (SSS) to totalize 
the rights acquired in different SSS was developed. In 
training, work conditions, non-discrimination by gender, 
sexual orientation, race, and age the EU promoted a lot 
of projects searching  for excellence and the 
demonstration of good practices in social inclusion.  MS 
maintained all the competences in SSS, labor market, 
bargaining, unions, the capabilities to develop a visible 
EU social policy are limited. Thus the EU way in social 
and employment matters is the coordination of the MS 
policies (see below). (EC–DG Employment, 2006). The structural reforms in labor market with which the European 
                                                 
10 In contrast with the MS, public budgets surpassing greatly half of the GDP the EU budget is confined to 1.24 per 
cent of the EU GDP. (European Court of Auditors, 2006).   
Table 3 
 
Activities of the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
•  Economic surveillance: euro area and EU 
o Member States country pages  
o Key indicators  
o Economic forecasts: spring, autumn and interim 
forecasts  
o Business and consumer surveys  
o Annual Review on the EU economy  
o Convergence reports  
•  Monitoring budgetary policies and public finances  
o Stability and Growth Pact and fiscal surveillance  
o Annual “Public Finance Report”  
o Contribution of public finances to growth and 
employment  
o The consequences of ageing  
•  Economic policy coordination  
o BEPG incl. Implementation report 
o Structural reforms  
o Luxembourg, Cardiff, and Cologne processes  
o Assessing the policy-mix in the euro area  
•  The euro: legal, practical and institutional aspects  
o Legal and institutional issues of the euro  
o Euro coins  
o Update and maintenance of the Commission's 
euro web site  
•  Financial markets and capital movement  
o Integration of EU financial markets  
o Freedom of capital movements  
•  Economic relations with third countries  
o Accession countries : economic aspects of 
enlargement  
o G7 Countries  
o Russia  
o Western Balkan Countries, Mediterranean 
Countries, and development issues  
o Macro-financial assistance to third countries  
o Relations with international financial institutions: 
IMF, WB, EBRD,... 
•  Financing  
o Investment Financing  
o EIB  
o EIF  
o Funding Programmes for SMEs  
o Funding for Trans-European Networks  
o Euratom loans  
o Opinions and surveys on investments for the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance 
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employment rate, productive capacity, growth, and living standard should be propelled are stopped due to their 
potential political cost for the responsible MS. (See figure E in the Appendix.)   
 
VII. Other Community policies and initiatives. In a range of matters the EU is developing actions according to 
different exigencies or possibilities. Some correspond to Community competences or are close of it: fisheries, forests, 
environment, etc. A lot of other miscellaneous actions of the EU correspond to general possibilities or purposes, such 
as: peace interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, or Lebanon; air regulations, space technology and engines; 
immigration and border control; and justice and police affairs.  
 
 
B. The EU Structural Reforms Policy 
The policies of structural reform (SR) were introduced explicitly in the European Union during the process of 
discussion of the financial perspectives and budget of the Community for 2000-2006 named Agenda 2000. In Spring 
2000 the Lisbon European Council agreed upon a common strategy for the EU to become by 2010 “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world". (EC, 2006; EC-Economic Policy Committee, 
many years) 
The Lisbon Strategy (LS) mixes different exigencies: the liberal orientations imprinting EP in the US, the UK and 
in some other MS, the interest in the depth of the competition policy, existing structural EU policies as well as regional 
policy, and the convenience of introducing some strategic perspectives on the current EU policies. Profiting from the 
discussion of the budgetary impact of the community policies, some MS pressed to enlarge the budget support for 
technological policies, reducing the CAP and structural funds, and orienting these to support the competitiveness of 
the less favored regions. 
As with the majority of the EU developments, this was reached by successive approximations with a formidable 
design. The immediate precedent for the LS and the Agenda 2000 were the White Book on Growth Initiative (Jacques 
Delors, dir., 1992) and the Inter-institutional Agreement on Financial Perspectives,  called the budget Packs Delors I 
and II for 1988-1993 and 1994-1999, respectively.  
 
I. Orientations of the SR and the LS. The LS mixes: i) general purposes, i.e. growth and employment rate objectives; 
ii) EU direct actions, i.e. some arrangements of the community policies; iii) EU influences, i.e. on the ECB policy; and 
iv) a large cooperation with MS, i.e. the so-called coordination of policies (see below). This LS mix produced a 
bittersweet taste. Thus the LS is both:  
•  Pro competitive, and it should be considered an extension of EU competition policy. 
•  Pro productive, and it should be considered an extension of EU industrial strategy and of its competitiveness 
actions. 
•  Pro employment, and it should be considered an extension of EU social policies. 
•  Pro new economy, and it should be considered an extension of EU technological actions. 
•  Pro openness economy, and it should be considered an extension of EU trade policy. 
•  Pro deregulation, privatizing, limiting public intervention, producing high quality regulations. 
The LS bases its necessity in the analysis of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
11 The 
LS general orientation is compatible with the analysis OECD and IMF style.
12 In this sense the economic problem of 
Europe is the small growth due to the low employment rate and to the low productivity. These tendencies stopped the 
convergence and catching-up processes of the EU to the US and of the less advanced MS of the EU15 to the more 
developed. Although in the hands of the MS, the EU can help them to reform most of the regulations (Rodrigues, ed., 
2003, André Sapir, dir., 2003, and Wim Kok, dir., 2004).  
 
II.  Objectives of the SR and the LS. Inside the general EU equilibrium, the pro-competitive LS should be in 
agreement with the social orientations prevailing in the European socio-economic model. In particular the LS needs to 
be in agreement with the objectives of employment –more quantity and more quality- and of social inclusion. More 
precisely, the LS objectives are: 
•  Growth of GDP, given as the condition for employment. 
•  Stability, first of all of prices, later of public finances. 
•  Sustainability of public finances risked by large public deficits and by structural tendencies enlarging the pensions 
impact. 
•  Employment. 
•  Social orientation of the European Socialist Party (left), the partenariat orientation of the European Popular Party, 
social-Christian-democrat (centre-right). 
•  EU policies: Competition (easy), Regional (insisting on its pro-competitive orientation). 
•  Competitiveness and solidarity. 
 
                                                 
11 See before the first section of this paper and visit <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance>. 
12 See also before the first section of this paper and visit <http://www.oecd.org> and < http://www.imf.org>.  
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III. Instruments of the SR and the LS. In point of view of the instruments, for the EC (EC, 2006) the LS consists of: 
•  Effective Internal Market. 
•  Free & fair trade. 
•  Better regulation. 
•  Improving European infrastructure. 
•  Investing in Research & Development. 
•  Boosting innovation. 
•  Creating a strong industrial base. 
 
Table 4 
 
Economic Reforms, Structural Policies and Regulatory Reform:  
The Lisbon Strategy 
 
 
In spring 2000 the European Union set itself the goal of becoming "the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" by 2010 just developing a common 
strategy. 
A. THE GENERAL RULES, CONDITIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PROCEEDEES 
Terms used: 
Economic Reform, Structural Reforms, 
Regulatory Reform, Structural Policies, Offer 
Policies, Structural Basic Disequilibria, Positive 
Adjustments 
Taxation: 
Simplicity, 
Transparency, Reducing 
rates 
Public expenditure: 
Reducing subsidies to 
industries and 
agriculture 
(De)Regulation: 
Improving quality,  
Reducing its number, 
time and cost, Pro-
competitive 
orientation 
 
Privatization: 
liberalizing 
Financial: 
Reduction interest rates, 
Positive real interests 
Sustainability: 
Of growth, of environ-
ment, of public finance 
B. THE MARKETS… 
B.1. OF LABOR  B.2. OF CAPITAL 
Fiscal harmonization 
Securing guarantees 
Employment Labor 
Protection: 
Introducing 
Flexibility, Limiting 
the employer 
indemnities at layoff, 
Developing Flexi-
security 
Mobility: Introducing 
stimulus 
 Wages: Reflecting 
productivity 
Social Security System: 
Pensions reforms 
(rights capitalization, 
retarding retirement 
age, reducing pension 
promise) 
Substituting the passive policies by active policies 
Land Use Reform: 
Suppress negative 
impacts on Industry 
Location and on 
Housing Costs 
B.3. OF PRODUCTS… 
Intermediate 
consumption  Final consumption  Introducing 
competition, 
competitive pressure 
Suppressing barriers to 
entry in the activities 
Energy Liberalize  prices 
B.4. AND OF SERVICES… 
The EUA and the 
Unique Market 
Program 
Network Industries  Telecommunications, 
phone  Transports: Competition
Public services: price 
recover costs 
Banking: Reducing 
administered credits 
Reduction of foreign 
tariffs, suppression 
quotas 
Finance 
Public services  Suppressing concerted 
practices 
Suppressing market 
effects of corporations 
 
Privatization Post 
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•  More and better jobs. 
•  Adaptable workforce.  
•  Better education and skills. 
 
IV. Main fields of the SR and the LS. The main fields of the LS are, as it shows below in the table 4: 
•  General conditions. 
•  Labor Market. 
•  Product Markets. 
•  Capital market. 
•  Service Markets. 
 
V. Conditions to SR and the LS. To introduce the SR and to advance the LS Fund, linking SR to competition. The 
best moment, the best way to reform.  
 
Table 5 
The Lisbon Strategy: Objectives, Instruments, and Competences 
Objectives Instruments  Main 
Competence 
To develop and to strength the internal market  EU law and MS 
implementation 
To ensure foreign opened  
and internally competitive markets 
EU: Commercial 
Policy. MS: State aid 
reform. 
EU 
To improve the EU and MS regulations  EU and MS law  Shared 
To enlarge and to improve the European 
infrastructures 
Public and Private 
investments 
To enlarge and to improve the investments  
in Research and Development 
Taxation and Public 
Expenditure 
MS with EU 
support 
To promote innovation, the Communication 
 and Information Technologies 
Aids and university 
reform  MS 
To enlarge the European industrial basis  Industrial projects  Shared 
To enlarge the employment rate  Labor market 
regulations 
To modernize the social protection 
To improve the adaptability, mobility 
and flexibility of the labor force and of the 
enterprises 
Fiscal and Labor 
Regulations 
Human capital investment 
Education systems 
reform 
 
MS 
 
In this sense is so interesting the establishment of an European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF).  The 
EGF aims to help workers made redundant as a result of changing global trade patterns to find another job as quickly 
as possible. In 2005 the Commission emphasised the benefits of opening markets and increased international 
competition, but also highlighted the need to help workers whose jobs disappear to find new jobs quickly. (EC, 2005) 
Commission proposed offsetting up a Fund to provide a European response to help those adjusting to the 
consequences of globalisation. This was designed to be a sign of solidarity from those who benefit from openness to 
the few who face the sudden shock of losing their job. From an agreement of the EU leaders in December 2005.  
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During 2006 the Council and the European Parliament debated and refined the concept, until it was adopted on 20 
December 2006.
13 The fund was launched by the European Union in 2007 and will provide up to 500 million euro a 
year in support. (Andrew Hughes Hallet, Sevend S. Hougaard Jensen and Christian Richter, 2005) 
   More open trade leads to overall benefits for growth and employment, but it can cost some jobs. All Member 
States, large and small, new and old, can be affected by these changes and will all therefore be eligible for EGF 
assistance. While the EU Structural Funds support the anticipation and management of change with activities such as 
life-long-learning with a strategic and long-term perspective, the EGF will provide one-off, time-limited individual 
support geared to helping workers who are 'severely and personally affected by trade-adjustment redundancies'. 
Starting from 1 January 2007, the EGF can fund active labour market policies focused entirely on helping the workers 
affected by globalisation-related redundancies, for example through: 
•  Job-search assistance, occupational guidance, tailor-made training and re-training including IT skills and 
certification of acquired experience, outplacement assistance and entrepreneurship promotion or aid for self-
employment. 
•  Special time-limited measures, such as job-search allowances, mobility allowances or allowances to individuals 
participating in lifelong learning and training activities. 
•  Measures to stimulate in particular disadvantaged or older workers, to remain in or return to the labour market. 
It is intended to complement support provided by the employers and national authorities concerned in terms of 
active employment measures. It will not fund passive social protection measures such as retirement pensions or 
unemployment benefits, which are the competence of the Member States. (Martin Feldstein and Horst Siebert, eds., 
2002) 
Table 6 
Flexicurity: 
The Four Components of An Active Employment Policy 
 
 
      The 2006/2007 Joint Employment Report (Council of the European Union and European Commission, 2007) 
developed a broad view on flexicurity comprising four components, all of them related to the guidelines and 
priority areas of the Growth and Jobs Strategy: 
•  Flexible contractual arrangements, both from the perspective of the employer and the employee, through 
modern labor laws allowing for sufficiently flexible work arrangements and reducing labor market 
segmentation and undeclared work. The link between productivity and wages is part of such arrangements. 
•  Active Labor Market Policies which effectively help people to cope with rapid change, unemployment 
spells and transitions to new jobs  
•  Reliable and responsive lifelong learning systems to ensure the continual adaptability and employability of 
workers. Financial and other incentives should be reviewed to achieve a breakthrough. EU funding should 
strongly support these enhanced efforts. 
•  Modern Social Security systems which combine the provision of adequate income support with the need to 
facilitate labor market mobility. This includes the removal of all restrictions on the mobility of workers within 
the EU. 
See the table C in the Appendix for some developments on flexicurity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. The European Monetary Policy 
Since 1999, the ECB has managed European monetary policy according to his independent status and in agreement 
with the Council of the Union and the EC. During this time the standing of the euro appears solid and the results in 
point of view of its objectives are excellent. The independence of the   fosters price stability. Enshrined in the EU 
Treaty the ECB independence is institutional, operational, and financial independence and vis-à-vis either the 
Community institutions or national governments. 
Of contemporary tasks of central banks, transparency is essential for gaining credibility and for realising its 
objective in a gentle way, i.e. specifying its quantitative definition of price stability. The institutional system of the 
                                                 
13  Official Journal of the European  Union, No. L 406, Dec . 30. 
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ECB is so complex, mixing the participation of the central bank of all the EU27 MS and a special framework with the 
central bank of the euro area (€A) (ECB, 2006). 
The management of monetary policy by the Eurosystem is based on an operational decentralisation. It arises from 
the principle of subsidiarity, which underlies the entire European integration process. The monetary policy decisions 
are made in a centralised fashion, by the Governing Council of the ECB, but implemented by the national central 
banks. The Eurosystem benefits from an efficient operational framework and from procedures that guarantee a high 
level of security for payment systems, especially the Target system. The strategic ECB framework is based on a 
precise definition of the primary objective of price stability, defined as an annual increase in the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices close to but below 2% of the medium-term. This choice is made in order to exclude situations of 
deflation and inflation differentials in the €A.  
In the ECB "medium term" orientation the single monetary policy does not have a fixed horizon defined ex ante 
but is medium-term oriented. This is a two-pillar approach: cross-checking of the economic analysis for short-term 
determinants of inflation; and the monetary analysis of long-term determinants of inflation. There are two 
achievements of the ECB monetary policy: i) the credibility of the single monetary policy. In spite of adverse 
exogenous supply shocks, leading to a rise in HICP above 2%, long-term inflation expectations anchored at around 
1.8% to 1.9%; and most of monetary policy decisions were correctly anticipated by the markets. 
The achievements of the monetary policy relies on the smooth functioning of multilateral surveillance procedures 
within EMU. There is a framework of multilateral surveillance procedures. Thus the implementation is entrusted to the 
Eurogroup composed of the €A economy MS ministers, or the Ecofin composed of all of the MS Ministers of 
Economy. In these meetings, all economic fields are considered: labour market (Luxembourg process), product and 
capital markets (Cardiff process), wage development (Cologne process), and fiscal policy (SGP). The whole process is 
coordinated under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) recommendations, which encompass a medium-
term assessment of the convergence of the economies. The performances are annually scrutinised, following the SGP 
updates. 
Thus the fiscal discipline within a cooperative framework is the corollary to the European unique monetary policy. 
The SPG imposes the same fiscal discipline to all EU members. MS are expected to consider their economic policies 
as a matter of "common concern". The acceding countries will abide by the same rules. In another sense the euro is a 
powerful driving force towards more economic and financial integration and an international currency. There are three 
pillars to be an optimal currency area:  
•  The macroeconomic fundamentals defining the Eurosystem: a low level of inflation; the resilience of the banking 
and financial system; quality of the labour force and the infrastructure. As a consequence, during this period the 
€A receive more foreign direct investments than the US. (Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, 2005) 
•  A growing economic homogeneity favours monetary policy transmission. There is an increasing correlation 
between national and the €A business cycles. The inflation dispersion in the €A is not much higher than in the US, 
whereas the latter benefits from a unifying federal budget. There is a rising homogeneity of responses of MS to 
monetary policy impulses. 
•  The changeover to the euro acted as a catalyst for financial integration. The establishment of a euro money market 
is a process almost complete. The price differentials in interbank markets is under five basis points. It is underway 
in European bond markets, as well as in derivatives markets, with a healthy development of the Eurex. The EU 
financial architecture frames up, completing the process in the field of financial regulation and supervision. 
The euro successfully became an international currency and a nominal anchor. There have been a lot of 
developments in the private use of the euro. As a financial instrument, the euro took off immediately: more than 60% 
of net issuance of international debt securities are in euro, bolstered by EU companies and households. The euro is 
already a significant intermediary in exchanges.
14 The euro is acting a growing pricing role in trading activities: in the 
€A 60% of international trade outside the zone was denominated in euro, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. 
There is a growing official role of the euro: it’s the second reserve currency after the US dollar, a factor of 
diversification of currency reserves against fluctuations. (Ahearne et alii, 2007) There is a trend bound to gain 
momentum as major Asian central banks want to better balance their assets between US dollar and the euro. The euro 
is an anchor for a number of exchange rate regimes: euro is used as a monetary benchmark (sole anchor or currency 
baskets) in 51 countries, with strong ties or institutional arrangements with the EU.  
                                                 
14 The euro has the 26 % of foreign exchange transactions, the dollar's share is 51 %, and this is more than the sum of shares of the 
European legacy currencies. (IMF, 2007) 
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  As a single currency for the EU, the euro faces 
important challenges. A strengthening budgetary cohesion 
and co-ordination in the EU is needed. In line with the 
concept of structural balances, EU MS should respect their 
commitment to achieve in the business cycle a budgetary 
position that is "close to balance or in surplus".  Incentives 
should be devised to strengthen sound fiscal policy in good 
times to get margins for the rainy days. Complementary 
structural reforms are needed in several areas. To be a 
knowledge-based economy the 2000 Lisbon strategy the 
corporate attractiveness  should be developed creating 
"agglomeration dynamics". Certainly the €A benefits from 
its high purchasing power but progress is required as regards 
controlling production costs (labour costs). In goods and 
services market integration reforms are needed to remove 
entry barriers and promote complete integration, especially 
in the services, but also in energy and transport sectors and 
postal services. 
Some challenges of the euro are related to the latest 
enlargements. There are some institutional challenges 
concerning the Eurosystem decision-making process: voting 
procedures have already been amended. But the 
implementation of the whole EU institutional framework is 
still a challenge, especially concerning the anti money-
laundering procedures and the upgrading of banking 
supervision. 
A sustainable convergence should be an interesting 
contribution to be a monetary optimum area. A real 
convergence must be achieved, in spite of the development 
gap even with the acceding countries supposing only 44 per 
cent of total GDP per capita of the €A. The catching-up 
process needs 25 years under the hypothesis of a 1.5% 
growth differential. But it has to be compatible with the 
nominal convergence. The disinflation must continue, the 
inflation rates are twice as high as in the €A. The fiscal 
position of new MS: the average public deficit is at 5 per 
cent and the external deficit is at 4 per cent of the GDP. The 
competitiveness must be preserved.  
In this convergence process the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism or European Monetary System II is a "training 
room" rather than a "waiting room". The ECB follows a 
pragmatic approach: a successful participation in this 
stabilization mechanism is essential to achieve rate stability, 
decided on a case-by-case approach, in order to prevent 
excessive volatility of exchange rates. A flexible approach: 
to enhance economic cohesion, the mechanism envisages the 
possibility of  realignments during the period of participation. 
 
D. The European Policy Mix:  
The Stability and Growth Pact and the EP 
Coordination 
The NEEP is in formation: necessities, objectives, 
instruments, institutions, coordination, management, and 
analysis. In the past, a strong necessity for common EP and 
coordination between MS made itself evident with the 
general floating of currencies after the dollar gold 
suspension in 1971. Thus a European Monetary System is in 
operation since 1999. During the transition phase to the 
EMU the convergence Maastricht criteria generated the 
necessity to coordinate MS policy mix.  
 
I. The Stability and Growth Pact. Then the SGP 
prevented the occurrence of an excessive budgetary deficit in the euro area (€A). As the Treaty  provided only for 
quantitative criteria for the adoption of the unique currency and not for any definition of a budgetary policy to be 
Figure 6 
The Policy-Mix:  
Orientations and Performances 
Panel A. Euro Area Policy Mix Orientation 
 
Panel B. United States Policy Mix Orientation 
 
 
  Output Gap (discontinuous line) = Potential GDP – Effective GDP 
  Policy  Mix (continuous line) = Monetary and Financial Component 
(white column) + Fiscal Component (coloured column) 
  Accommodative Policy-MixÆ Effective GDP >Potential GDP 
 Restrictive Policy-Mix Æ Effective GDP <Potential GDP 
Panel C. Euro Area Policy Mix Performance 
Panel D. United States Policy Mix 
Performance 
 Change of Real Short Term Interest Rate 
 Change of Public Deficit 
 Four  Policy-Mix combinations appear in each figure 
Source : L’Angevin and Montagné (2006) 
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conducted after the changeover to the euro, the adoption of such a pact was considered necessary by the MS. The SGP 
intended to ensure sound management of public finances in the €A in order to prevent a situation arising in which one 
MS lax budgetary policy penalises the other MS via interest rates  
and undermines confidence in the economic stability of the €A. It seeks to achieve sustained and lasting 
convergence of the economies of the MS belonging to the €A.  
The SGP was adopted by the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 as a resolution on the stability and GDP 
growth.
15 The implementation of the SGP rests primarily on two pillars: i) the principle of multilateral surveillance of 
budgetary positions and ii) the excessive deficit procedure. In addition, the BEPGs, which the Council addresses to the 
MS, are intended to help them frame their economic policies effectively. To be more precise, this involves:  
•  Multilateral surveillance. With a view to coordinating their economic and financial situations, the MS in the €A 
present a stability programme containing medium-term public accounting objectives that are updated each year. 
The MS outside the €A draw up 'convergence' programmes. These programmes serve as a basis for multilateral 
surveillance within the Council. Any fiscal slippage may therefore form the subject matter of a Council 
recommendation, which may be made public.  
•  An excessive deficit procedure. This procedure is triggered if a MS exceeds the public deficit criterion, which is 
set at 3% of GDP. If the existence of an excessive deficit is established by the Council, it issues recommendations 
to the MS concerned calling on it to take steps to put an end to the excessive deficit. If the MS does not comply 
with these recommendations or does not take steps to remedy the situation, the Council may impose sanctions on 
it, initially in the form of a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Community. The deposit will, as a rule, be 
converted into a fine if, within the next two years, the excessive deficit has not been corrected.  
Since the third stage of EMU was embarked upon, the multilateral surveillance procedure has given rise to a 
constant dialogue on economic and budgetary policy between MS. The BEPGs are a central element of this dialogue. 
They take the form of recommendations drawn up each year by the Council, acting on a Commission proposal, and 
then issued to the MS, which are required to frame their economic policies accordingly. Each year the Commission 
draws up a report on their implementation.  
The Commission is responsible for monitoring implementation of the SGP. If it seems likely that a MS will not 
meet its obligations with respect to its economic policy, the Council may, on a recommendation from the Commission, 
issue a specific recommendation to the MS concerned (early warning). If the MS does not comply with the 
recommendation and the deficit exceeds 3% of GDP, an excessive deficit procedure is triggered. 
In view of the difficulties that some MS are having in achieving their budgetary targets compared with the 
commitments entered into, a lively debate began in 2002 on the SGP and on the commitments for achieving balanced 
or surplus budgets. The debate surrounding the SGP gathered momentum following a ruling on 13 July 2004 by the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities concerning the excessive deficit procedures initiated against Germany 
and France (Case C-27/04). In November 2003 the Commission had sent to the Council recommendations for 
speeding up the excessive deficit procedure in both cases. However, the Council did not act on those recommendations 
and suspended the excessive deficit procedures. It argued that its conclusions were of a political nature. 
The Court ruled that: i) the action of the Commission against the Council for failure to adopt the formal 
instruments contained in the Commission recommendations was inadmissible; and ii) the Council conclusions of 25 
November 2003 adopted in respect of France and Germany were annulled as regards suspension of the excessive 
deficit procedure. Following these findings and in view of the debate surrounding the stability and growth pact, in 
September 2004 the Commission adopted a communication on strengthening economic governance and clarifying the 
implementation of the SGP and proposing some possible improvements. The Commission was concerned primarily 
with economic developments in the MS and with the long-term sustainability of public finances.  
The €A MS will share a unique monetary policy and a single exchange rate, while the other aspects of economic 
policy will remain national issues. To the extent that national economic developments will influence monetary 
conditions in the €A, closer Community surveillance and coordination of economic policies among €A MS will be 
necessary. All MS, including those remaining outside the €A (Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) must be 
included in the coordination of economic policies, as they all participate in the unique market and may also participate 
in the new exchange rate mechanism. (Bodil Nyboe Andersen, 2005; and Ian Bache, 2005) Coordination must adhere 
to the principle of subsidiarity. Enhanced surveillance and coordination should cover the following areas:  
•  Macroeconomic developments in MS and the development of the exchange rate for the euro. 
•  Budgetary positions and policies.  
•  Structural policies in labour, product and services markets, as well as cost and price trends.  
To ensure the smooth functioning of EMU, the BEPGs should provide more concrete and country-specific 
guidelines and focus more on measures to improve growth potential and create jobs. MS should commit themselves to 
a comprehensive and speedy exchange of information on economic developments and policy intentions with a cross-
border impact, even if there is no threat of a deterioration in the budgetary situation. For its part, the Council could 
show more inclination to address recommendations to MS whose EP are not consistent with the broad guidelines. 
                                                 
15 Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. It was amended by: i) Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005, dealing with the surveillance of 
the MS budgetary positions and the coordination of their economic policies (prevention aspect); and ii) Regulation 
(EC) No 1056/2005, on the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure whenever a MS exceeds the reference 
value, i.e. a deficit of more than 3% of GDP (punitive aspect). (EC, 2007)  
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The Ecofin Council occupies the defining position at the centre of the economic coordination and decision-making 
process. Whenever matters of common interest are addressed, they will be discussed by the ministers of all MS. 
However, the ministers of the MS participating in the €A may meet informally among themselves to discuss issues 
connected with their shared specific responsibilities for the unique currency. (Guido Tabellini and Charles Wyploz, 
2004) 
As the Council must monitor the development of the euro exchange rate, it is important for it to be able to 
exchange views and information with the ECB. It may, in exceptional circumstances, formulate general orientations 
for exchange-rate policy in relation to non-EC currencies. These general orientations must respect the independence of 
the ECB and be consistent with its primary objective which is to maintain price stability. The Council should decide 
on the position of the Community on issues of particular relevance to EMU, in connection with both bilateral relations 
with third countries and proceedings in international organisations or informal international groupings. Only euro-zone 
MS will participate in votes. (Denis et alii, 2005) 
The Council and the European Central Bank will represent the Community at international level in compliance 
with the allocation of powers laid down in the Treaty. On elements of economic policy other than monetary and 
exchange-rate policy, the MS should continue to present their policies outside the Community framework, while 
taking full account of the Community interest. 
Representation in international organisations should take account of those organisations' rules. For example, only 
countries can be members of the IMF. In the light of the allocation of responsibilities laid down in the EU Treaty, the 
harmonious economic development of the Community will necessitate continuous dialogue between the Council and 
the ECB, involving the Commission and respecting all aspects of the independence of the ECB. The Economic and 
Financial Committee will provide the framework within which the dialogue can be prepared and pursued at senior 
official level. 
 
II. Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
The BEPGs are the main instrument for coordinating the economic policies of the MS. For the first time they cover 
a period of three consecutive years in order to rationalise and synchronise the process of coordinating economic 
policies with employment policy. The broad outlines for 2005-2008 emphasise the contribution of economic policies 
to the Lisbon Strategy 
The first part contains the general guidelines for all MS and the Community and a section devoted to the 
challenges specific to the €A. The second part contains recommendations for individual MS and takes account of their 
specific situations. The Commission has updated the broad guidelines for 2004 in a new recommendation that includes 
the 10 new MS in the current framework for economic policy coordination. The policy guidelines for the EU15 remain 
entirely relevant. To help it achieve the Lisbon Strategy the Council decided to rationalise the various processes for 
coordinating economic policy and employment policy. The BEPGs emphasise the contribution of these policies to the 
Lisbon programme. In addition to these BEPGs, MS must apply the employment guidelines and related 
recommendations.  
The economic growth has been significantly weaker than anticipated because of geopolitical tensions, a slowdown 
in external demand and falling confidence among businesses and consumers. Employment prospects are therefore 
likely to deteriorate. Inflation has remained just above 2%, but could drop below that level in future. Economic 
policies must therefore bolster confidence and thereby help to create conditions for stronger domestic demand and job 
creation in the short term and an expansion of growth potential in the medium term. 
The growth and stability-oriented macroeconomic policies play a key role in sustaining growth and employment 
and in preserving price stability. MS should, in particular: i) To reach or maintain budgetary positions that are close to 
balance or in surplus throughout the economic cycle; ii) To correct any excessive deficits in line with the SGP; and iii) 
Subject to this, to avoid pro-cyclical policies that counteract the symmetric play of the automatic stabilisers over the 
cycle. (Paul de Grauwe, 2003) 
MS should promote the right framework for wage negotiations by the social partners. It is important that they 
ensure that nominal wage increases are consistent with price stability and productivity gains. Labour cost increases 
should remain moderate to allow more job-creating investment.  
Structural reforms are essential to increase the EU's growth potential. To yield maximum synergies, they should be 
implemented in a comprehensive and coordinated way. The MS should introduce the following measures over the next 
three years (the reforms to boost employment are described in detail in the employment guidelines: 
•  Make the tax and benefits system more employment-friendly. 
•  Make sure that wage bargaining systems take account of differences in productivity and that these are reflected in 
wages. 
•  Review Labour market regulations: access to the labour market, employment protection, more flexible work 
organisation. 
•  Facilitate labour mobility, both geographical and occupational.  
•  Ensure efficient active labour market policies.  
Related to the productivity: 
•  Foster competition in the markets for goods and services, by increasing the transposition rate of internal market 
directives, by further opening up public procurement, by ensuring the independence of competition authorities and 
by reducing and reorienting state aid. 
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•  Accelerate the integration of EU capital markets, by implementing 
the Risk Capital Action Plans and the Financial Services Action 
Plan. (M.-J. Radio and C.A. Bates Jr., eds., 2006) 
•  Foster entrepreneurship and the creation of small and medium-
sized enterprises.  
•  Promote investment in knowledge, new technologies and 
innovation by increasing public and private expenditure on R&D 
to make progress towards the 3% of GDP objective, for example 
by developing a framework conducive to R&D, facilitating the 
protection of intellectual property  promoting the Action Plan, 
developing the Galileo satellite navigation system and improving 
education and training. 
•  Enhance the contribution of the public sector to growth, by 
providing more growth-enhancing, cost-effective investment in 
physical and human capital and knowledge, increasing the 
efficiency of the public sector and promoting joint public-private 
initiatives. 
To strengthening the long-term sustainability of public finances 
the EU EP coordination proposes: i) reduce public debt ratios. MS 
with government debt ratios above the 60% of the GDP reference 
value should ensure a satisfactory pace of government debt reduction 
towards that value; ii) design, introduce and effectively implement 
reforms of pension systems, for example encouraging people to 
extend their working lives, linking benefits to contributions better and 
improving access to supplementary pension schemes, etc.; and like 
the MS, the Community should apply strict budgetary discipline.  
The economic and social cohesion needs to modernise social 
protection systems while ensuring an adequate level of protection and 
fighting poverty and exclusion, and to improve the functioning of 
markets to encourage private investment in regions that lag behind, 
ensure that public support, including from EU sources, is focused on 
investment in human capital and infrastructure, and that investment 
programmes are designed and administered efficiently.  
The efficient management of natural resources should:  
•  Reduce sectoral subsidies, tax exemptions and other incentives 
that have a negative environmental impact. 
•  Reduce subsidies to non-renewable energy, promote energy 
efficiency and increase the proportion of renewable energy. 
•  Adjust the system of transport taxes, charges and subsidies to 
better reflect environmental damage and social costs and to 
increase competition in transport modes such as rail freight. 
•  Renew efforts to meet the commitments under the Kyoto 
protocol, for example by introducing a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.  
There specific challenges to the €A. Economic growth failed to fulfil its potential. The guidelines list four 
challenges for the €A: to strengthen potential growth, to cater for balanced macroeconomic policies, to monitor 
inflation differences, and finally to strengthen economic policy coordination.  
The Council advises national decision-makers in the €A to strive for an economic policy mix that is compatible 
with price stability and with business and consumer confidence. Countries in the €A should maintain budgetary 
positions that are close to balance or in surplus throughout the economic cycle in cyclically adjusted terms. Where 
necessary, they must ensure an annual improvement of at least 0.5% of GDP, and those countries with excessive 
deficits need to correct them. They are asked to analyse the causes of inflation differences in order to take measures in 
sectors where such differences are undesirable. As far as policy coordination is concerned, the members of the €A 
should deepen the analysis and discussion of economic developments (exchange of information, external 
representation, etc.) and improve the efficiency of coordination procedures in the area of structural reforms. 
 
 
IV. NEEP: Performances and Challenges  
 
Does NEEP correspond to the new EE? To what measure are the EE performances due to NEEP? Now the EE is a 
stable economy and NEEP is well-oriented. But there are some substantive challenges to the EE: i.e. aging, 
globalization, deindustrialization, low employment and productivity, territorial and cultural disparities. Largest of the 
problems facing the EE is NEEP is possessed of limitations  not easily surpassed. A more effective EU action towards 
structural reforms placing  emphasis on pro-competition in the economy and European institutions is sorely needed. 
Meanwhile, the impact of non-competition reduces the Europeans living-standard. 
Figure 7 
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A. Economic Performance and NEEP 
The contemporary performance of the EE should be evaluated as follows: 
I. By macroeconomic indicators: GDP, employment, unemployment, inflation, interest, …as usual. In this sense the 
EE appears to be less productive than it could be, but more stable, balanced and sustainable.  
II. From a historical perspective: the EE was so slow to grow in the middle of the nineties. The catching-up process 
stalled, the gaps are widening… perhaps due not to the huge difficulties of the EE so much as the easy way in which 
the US economy functions.   
The times in which EP were a means ‘competition’ between states appears to have passed. There is perhaps an 
exception: the exchange rate. For Europe is evidently in the hands of the US dollar - to have no exchange rate policy 
or at least some exchange rate capacity is one of the biggest limitations of NEEP. 
III. From  a comparative perspective: related to the US and the other advanced economies of the OECD, the EE 
works less but of a higher quality. The American ‘twin deficits’ are European ‘twin surpluses’, the American 
instability is European stability, the American strength and unsustainable growth is a European weakness and 
sustainable growth. (Martin Neil Baily and Robert Z. Lawrence, 2004) 
IV. By groups of MS: 
•  The entire EU27 and its parts: the more developed old EU15, the new accessional or transitional MS. NEEP 
was implemented for old Europe. Probably the new MS need an EP more involved than the NEEP is. They 
may do it because monetary policy remains in their competence. 
•  The €A or the 13 MS versus the non-euro or non-euro MS by opting-out, such as UK or Denmark, or by not 
satisfying the participation criteria. Most likely the opt-out MS should remain in a productive position. 
V. By size of MS: 
•  The big MS: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain have tired answers to challenges.   
•  The medium countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary, have less latitude in concocting a 
national EP, and are more pressed to adapt a pro-competitive stance. 
•  The small countries such as Portugal or the Czech Republic, as well as the tiny countries such as 
Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, are pressed to accept and digest market constraints. 
VI. By socio-economic models and levels:  
•  Economic orientation, whether pro-competitive, liberal, state-oriented or nationalist, is a determining factor 
of the different impacts EP have. The best results of this MS is contrasted. 
•  Cyclical momentum: Does a European cycle exist? (Michael Artis, 2004) Are the individual MS in different 
moments of the cycle and thus should the results of a single monetary policy be different? 
VII. To not be an optimal monetary zone: 
•  Integration grades:  
•  Wealth or living-standard. There are rich and poor MS/regions: do they need different policies? In the range 
of EU policies does each of them find the policy style or measure they demand? Probably this is certain for 
the poorest regions having a consistent European regional policy. The question should be more sensitive to 
ECB monetary policy: what single central interest do differential effects produce? The answers are in the 
asymmetries (European Central Bank, 2006 and 2007). 
•  Other considerations, as well as the geography, culture or religion tendencies should be reduced to the former. 
(Fernando Ballabriga, Miguel Sebastián and Javier Vallès, 1999) 
 
There is unanimity: the highly-performing MS are small, Nordic, liberal or social-democrat (while applying   
flexicurity
16). NEEP has almost served to introduce rationality to EP developed by the MS. The range is established, 
sometimes the competences are contained in a common body and  more and more in a coordinated fashion. In any 
case, the great question is how many of  the of the EE results are due to NEEP. Surely there are asymmetric answers to 
the single monetary policy. 
 
 
                                                 
16 See the table 6 and the table B below in the Appendix. 
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Table 7 
Dynamics of the European Economic Policy 
Objectives  Date  Instruments, Developments 
European Integration  1950  Schumann Declaration 
Common Authority Market  1951-2  Treaty est. European Coal and 
Steel Community 
General Common Market (and of 
nuclear industry) 
1956-7  Rome Treaty est. European (Eco.) 
Community (and T.e. E. Atomic 
Energy C. - EURATOM) 
Agricultural Common Policy  1962  European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF - 
FEOGA) 
Custom union  1967  Common European Tariff 
Common Floating Exchange Rates  1972  European Monetary System: ecu, 
market interventions 
Regional actions  1974  European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) 
Enlargements with Western 
Europe States 
1973,  1981,  
1986  and 
1995 
Consolidation of European 
Communities (EU15) 
Reduce Financial Impact of 
Common Agricultural Policy 
1984  First CAP reform: stabilize budget 
First reform Treaties, 
Internal Market 
1986  Single European Act 
 
Regional cohesion  1988  Structural funds, Budget Delors 
packs 
Political union 
Monetary union proposal 
1991-3  European Union Treaty 
Maastricht financial criteria for 
monetary convergence 
Employment, Productivity, 
Competitiveness, Structural 
Reforms 
1993  European Growth Strategy 
Employment, Codification and 
Governanza 
1997-9  Amsterdam and Nice Treaties 
Monetary union 
 
 
Coordination of Economic (and 
Employment) Policies 
1999  European Central Bank 
 
Stability and Growth Pact: deficit 
control and sustainability of public 
MS finances (BEPGs) 
Structural Reforms of Labor, 
Product and Service Markets: 
introduction of competition 
2000  Lisbon Strategy 2000-2010 
Constitution for Europe proposal  2004  Codification, Chart of Rights, 
Transparency, Governanza rules 
Enlargement with Central and 
Eastern Europe States 
2004 & 
2007 
Consolidation of European Union 
(EU27) 
Financial perspectives  2007-2013  Budget impact of Community 
policies reform adjustments 
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 B. The Limitations of and the Debate on NEEP  
We know that the NEEP is: 
I. A mix of policies: a lot of common policies: regulation policies as well as trade and competition, distributive 
policies as regional cohesion, structural reform policy, monetary policy, and coordination/stabilization strategies. 
II.  A mix of objectives: growth, employment, price stability, integration, development, social inclusion. 
III. A collection of different instruments: basically regulations in the form of European regulations and subsidies co-
financing public MS investments in selected areas, or subsidies to farmers.  
The NEEP is not one policy but a sum of EU policies. NEEP was not logically formulated or hierarchically 
ordered so much as the result of different EU purposes. In this sense the first virtue of NEEP is its own existence: for a 
long time no EP existed in the European Communities, no EP was needed. In 1991 the EMU announcement 
introduced a qualitative change and the necessity to develop the instruments comprising NEEP, commencing with the 
Maastricht criteria and continued from 1999 retaining the limit of the public deficit (SGP) and introducing the 
coordination of MS EP (BEPGs).  
The EMU reinforces the typical common policies – those which appeared also from absolute necessity: trade 
policy (external) and competition policy (internal). Thus NEEP appears to be: i) canonic, traditional, balanced, well-
designed and elaborated, even well-implemented despite EU deficits and specifics; ii) unable to produce strong results 
in modifying the structural tendencies the EE has; and iii) as regards analysis and proposal of solutions are concerned, 
in excellent condition. Even in this there is a consensus. 
The NEEP is not possessed of the means of its ambitions. The problem is not the particular EP, nor the reduction 
of effectiveness by globalization. The NEEP problem is the inactivity of governments. The problem is: there is no 
political capacity to make the reforms NEEP requires - there are no governments belling the cat. (Marin Neil Baily and 
Diana Farrell, 2005) 
Some of the limitations of NEEP are as follows: 
•  Non-effectivity in certain points, i.e. in most of the structural reforms of the LS. NEEP does not act in certain 
aspects. 
•  Non-efficacy when persecuting certain objectives. The results obtained should be different than what is 
proposed. 
•  Non-efficiency when results obtained are not the best. 
Incoherence between the elements composing NEEP: common policies, structural policies, structural reforms, 
monetary policy, EP coordination and its instruments, the open method of coordination, the SGP, the BEPGs. Is the 
monetary policy coherent with growth? 
I. Non-coordination between the EU and the MS. 
II. The contradiction between EU policies and MS policies: i.e. on competition. 
III. The trade-off between objectives in EU policies: growth, employment, welfare,  
On the debate on NEEP, we can consider three aspects: i) it’s a new debate. The debate on NEEP is in 
development. In fact this debate is quite small; ii) it is limited to certain aspects, e.g. the application of the excessive 
deficit procedure; and iii) it is between specialists. The debate takes place among economists, think-tanks and the elite.  
Many MS don’t participate in the debate and most of the participants are from just a few MS, those large and 
advanced. The prism adopted is usually national, on the MS benefits or costs of different aspects of European policies. 
The debate turns on regulation and for coherence, the prevailing style is a regulatory one, and not in a de-regulatory or 
pro-competitive fashion.  
From America come the main contributions to European policies debate.
 17  The debate on Europe is larger and 
more qualified in America than in Europe. In the US the debate on NEEP is more consistent than in the EU. It is 
simple: the first analysis made is a comparative one, and the American analysis on America is fantastic. No doubt in 
the US, a federal EP has existed for a long time, the American point of view prevails in the States; they have the 
instruments, the mentality and the excellence centers to debate on America and…on Europe. The American 
institutions host the more acclaimed European debates, as well as these in which we are now participating. 
 
 
C. The NEEP Deficit 
There are some traditional traits of the EU which can also be seen as deficits:  
I. The EU democratic deficit owing to limitations on democratic rules. EU power resides in MS decision-making 
power. Broad transparency counterbalances this democratic deficit and the high complexity of the EU procedures. 
                                                 
17 As is the case for Baily and Kirkegaard (2004), it is the case for Philippe Aghion (et alii, 2006), Alberto Alesina (2005), Olivier 
Blanchard (2006), and Rajan (2004 and 2005), even Olaf Gersemann (2004) produced a similar one in the US.  
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But the democratic deficit is inherent to the ‘international-interstate-confederational’ nature of the EU. To be sure, 
NEEP suffers from this EU democratic deficit and converts it into a hypothetic policy. (Citi and Rodhes, 2007) 
II. The EU social deficit and the means of their resolution is in the hands of the MS with the social security system and 
other social services. Granted, NEEP suffers from this EU social deficit: the opposition between the obliged pro-
competitive orientation of NEEP and social interest can be improperly underlined. (Brunet, 2007.) 
III. The EU administrative deficit,  because of the complexity of the EU and the scarcity of its means. Thus the total 
EU budget is only 1% of the GDP. Furthermore, the power and capacity of MS to counteract EU policies is 
enormous, i.e. in competition matters, as the Endesa case shows.
18 So obviously, NEEP suffers from the EU 
administrative deficit.  
IV. Additionally to these three traditional deficits we detect an EU EP deficit. NEEP suffers:  
•  From the common EU democratic, social and administrative deficits stemming from NEEP: i) an astounding 
complexity in implementation, decision and management; ii) a sudden opposition to NEEP not with regards to 
EU social policy but to a hypothetical social policy. 
•  From its own limitations, its new economic problems, greater economic divergence and increased complexity of 
the governmental process 
All of these take away from the legitimacy of NEEP even though there is unanimity in most of its aspects.  From 
this a question, and not a joking one, appears: is NEEP postmodern? If yes, it is a fine discovery, remember the 
sentence ‘the best EP is a nonexistent EP’. But the problem is not a joke: if this NEEP didn’t exist, many MS EP 
would take its place. 
The NEEP deficit is not for free. There is a cost to non-structural reforms, a cost to non-competition, a cost to non 
NEEP
19: the gap between the European effective GDP per capita and its potential. During the time needed to attend to 
the complete development of a pro-competitive NEEP, European living-standards will remain with a notorious gap 
between it and  its potential. 
 
D. Challenges for NEEP: Some Policy Issues 
 
There are some uncertainties for the EE and they are the challenges for NEEP. Thus there are severe risks to: 
I.  The future of Europe, its frontiers and level of integration, the quality of the EU, its federal, confederational, 
international, and interstate form. The quantity of MS affects the quality, enlargement affects 
intensification..  
II. The results of the development of the new MS in transition to a developed market economy. 
III.  The extension and policy results of the €A.  
IV. The dynamics and impact of three structural tendencies: the aging, deindustrialization, globalization and 
delocation. (Stephan Shulmeister, 2000) 
V. The dynamics of NEEP and the time and conditions in which the LS of structural reforms will be implemented.  
VI. The dynamics of global imbalances, of the exchange rate of the US $, and the success of the Robert Mundell 
(1998) propositions for a global / four currencies agreement. (Rodrigo de Rato, 2007) 
VII. The capacity of the EU MS to limit the negative impact of the welfare state and SSS on the labor market: non 
sustainability of pension system, the immobility of workers, and the inflexibility of salaries. (J. Michie and 
M. Sheenan, 2003; and International Labour Office, 2007) 
VIII. The behavior of social agents: inflexibility, commodity and incapacity for change, the anti-competition 
attitude, anti-market, paternalism, assistentialism, protectionism, the social orientation of the opposition 
party, self-satisfaction, aversion to change, non change stimulus.  
IX. EP orientation: Protectionism, eco-nationalism based on securitizing ideas and on public service: in 
contradiction with  the Common Market and competition rules. (Council of the European Union, 2007) 
The limited capacity to introduce reforms, the thinking system has the capacity to advise, the elite produces a 
consensus, but transmission to the people is disturbed due to the demagogy turning on socialism and on 
nationalism as per usual in political battles. 
 
                                                 
18 The German company E.On presented a public offer for aquisition to the biggest Spanish energy company. Against all European 
Commission authorizations, the Prime Minister Zapatero handed over one half of Endesa to another Spanish company and the 
other to the Italian public company Enel. No doubt a large problem exists in Europe related to energy, public utilities, and 
competition. Hence the propositions to establish a new Community on energy, including oil, are healthy ways to make common 
pro-competitive and sustainable actions that Europe needs. (Pisani-Ferry, 2007). 
19 See table A in the Appendix.  
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V.  Conclusion:  
New Patterns in the European Economic Regulation 
 
Economic policy has changed enormously in Europe. Orientation is now liberal and in spite of the recurrent 
interventionism of some MS governments in some moments and matters. The actors pushing NEEP are also different: 
now the EU has the main competences in EP and the Council of the Union, the EC, and the ECB. 
New and successful is the story of the NEEP. The policy mix performs well, Europe is stable even if growth is 
small. The EU presents twin surpluses in place of the US twin deficits with strong growth and more instability. The 
European process of catching-up America halted from 1995. Thus the living-standard of the EU15 is a third lower than 
in the US. Although the social contrasts are in Europe more limited than in America. Solidarity and social security cost 
is higher in Europe, the employment rate lower, as is growth, income, and wellbeing. Is there a cost to welfare state? Is 
there a cost to non-competition? Sure it is.  
The question is: NEEP succeeds in joint matters, as price inflation is key for a commencing EMU. And social 
cohesion is a precious thing. But seeing the severe structural challenges of the EE, the halted convergence, reduced 
growth, the low employment rate, the limited competition and productivity… perhaps the incapacity of NEEP to 
reform the economy introducing competition is a catastrophic price Europe is paying for social and politic immobility. 
The certain NEEP success  could result in the future failure of Europe, of the European socio-economic model.  
To conclude on our analysis of NEEP we examine the EU forms: the non-discrimination principle, economicism, 
gradualism, acquis, the subsidiarity principle, the primacy of European law, the limited budget, enlargement, the 
intensification of Common policies, the development of competition policy, of structural funds. The enlargements to 
accommodate new MS in transition to the market economy, freedom and democracy, the rule of law and the welfare 
state  impose new determinations on the EU. The failure of the Constitution for Europe shows what can occur when 
the future is so open as is that of the EU. Imagine the impact of the entry of Turkey. The community constituted 
around the values of peace, freedom, democracy, market economy, competition, welfare, and social inclusion need to 
be reinforced by overcoming the democratic, social, administrative and EP deficits. 
The new EE in formation needs NEEP. The economic integration progresses from the SEA extending competition 
to services. In this sense the success of the EU is paradigmatic. First, it is a huge success: remember what was done to 
create competition in the phone market. But after this success, the EU failed: see the halted process of introducing 
competition in the net industries, i.e. in power supply. Great success in its first 60 years of integration, and the failure 
of the Constitution for Europe. The new EE is diverse indeed, if not disparate. NEEP can prove an expert guide to 
more explicitly aid closing the gap between the two Europe.  
 
       
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      Appendix 
 
Table A 
An Estimation of the Cost of the European Economy Disequilibria 
And of the Benefits of an European Economic Policy 
 
 
A limitation to growth  can be a source of growth after  to be 
removed 
Pool of problems and sources of solutions 
 
 
 
Costs of Problems 
=  Benefits of Solutions 
A+B. Living standard gap between EU15 and US 
 
30 % GDP  
A. Less Use of Labor  16% GDPpc (+/- 
10%) 
A.1. Less Employment rate in EU and in US  6% employment rate 
A.2. Unemployment compensation  2%  GDP 
A.3. Less Time of work  15 % annual time of 
work 
Contrast: i). Gap between Unemployment rate and NAIRU  1,5% employment 
Contrast: ii). Gap between Potential GDP and Current GDP  2% GDP 
   
B. Less Productivity  14% GDPphw 
B.1. Reduced economic freedom  1.5% GDP 
B.2. Over-regulation and non-competitive market practices  1% GDP 
B.3  Less skills  2% GDP 
B.4. Reduced flexibility of workers  2% GDP 
B.5. Investments in R + D 
(a 0,1% increase in Business R&D intensity enlarges 1,2% GDPpw) 
2% GDP 
B.6. Cost of non-Lisbon  8% GDPpw acc. in 10 
years 
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C. Broad   5% GDP 
C.1. Non-Europe Cost: benefits to complete the integration process  2% GDP 
C.2. The US-EU Free Trade Area Benefits  0,3% [0,9% for US] 
C.3. A 10% more trade exposure enlarges  4% GDPpw  
   
D. Cost of other disequilibria  10% GDP 
D.1. Economic  6% GDP 
D.1.1. Inflation price (a 1% reduction increases 0,4/0,5% GDPpw)  0,5% 
D.1.2.  CAP Agriculture Regulation Costs  0,4% GDP 
D.1.3. Trade imbalance  0,5% GDP 
D.1.4. Public deficit: Interests and Cost of investment eviction  2 % GDP 
D.1.5. Over Taxation and Unproductive public expenditures 
(a 1% reduction in tax burden enlarges GDPpw in 0,6/0,7%) 
2,5% GDP 
D.1.6. Deficit of Common EU Policies, Non Constitution for Europe  0,5% GDP 
D.2. Social  3% GDP 
D.2.1. Immigrant SSS benefits  0,5 GDP 
D.2.2. Deviation and Prisons Cost  1% GDP 
D.2.3. Environment: Degradation and Waste  1% GDP 
D.3. Politic  2% GDP 
D.3.1. Fraud, over-protection, and errors of the fiscal and the SSS  1,5 % GDP 
D.3.2. Political Instability in MS, Practices against the economic security  0,4% GDP 
Parameters of this estimation: To explain the gap between the US productivity by worker (around 65,000 $ PPC 
 and the EU living standard (around 25,000). 
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Table B 
Progress of the European Union in the Economic Policy Reforms 
 
 
A slowdown in labour productivity growth since the mid-1990s combined with weak growth in labour resource 
utilisation has resulted in a widening of the per capita income gap vis-à-vis the United States. 
 
Policy priorities 
 
Ease the regulatory burden on business operations 
Challenge and recommendations: To strengthen labour productivity performance, it was recommended that 
internal regulatory obstacles to cross-border trade and entry be further eased. This  should include an improvement 
of the EU-wide public procurement regime and the adoption of EU-wide standards if needed. 
Actions taken: The Commission submitted a draft Directive on Services in the Internal Market for a first reading 
to the European Parliament in March 2005. It underpins the freedom to provide services in another member state 
and the freedom for consumers to purchase services from providers in another member state. After the draft met 
with heavy opposition from some member states, the Commission is reconsidering the most contentious 
provisions. 
 
Raise competition in network industries 
Challenge and recommendations: To promote greater competition in product markets, it was recommended that 
barriers to market contestability in network industries, where incumbents remain dominant despite liberalisation 
measures in recent years, be further reduced. 
Actions taken: A new liberalisation package for port services, to be phased in by 2020, was tabled by the 
Commission in late 2004. In June 2005, the Commission began investigating possible distortions of competition in 
the electricity and gas sectors, and in July 2005, a regulation favouring competitive tendering processes in both 
public rail and road transport was introduced. 
 
Reduce producer support to agriculture 
Challenge and recommendations: To improve economy-wide and global efficiency, it was recommended to 
reduce high producer support to agriculture and to improve market access for non-EU countries. This would 
involve further moves away from production to income support and the elimination of export subsidies. 
Actions taken: Decoupling of support from output is being implemented in the hops, cotton, olive oil and tobacco 
sectors, adding to the range of products which were decoupled in 2003. A reduction of support to sugar producers 
has been agreed. Other actions are pending the outcome of the Doha trade round. 
 
Enhance intra-European labour mobility 
Challenge and recommendations: To promote the efficient allocation of labour resources, it was recommended 
that obstacles to cross-border labour mobility, notably the lack of cross-border portability of pension and social 
security entitlements, be removed.  
Actions taken: A pan-European Job Mobility Portal (EURES), disclosing information of national public 
employment services, is being implemented. A new “Social Agenda” launched by the Commission in February 
2005 aims to promote the cross-border portability of pension and social security entitlements. 
 
Further integrate European financial market  
Challenge and recommendations: In order to foster economic integration, the Financial Services Action Plan, 
the EU central tool to foster financial market integration, is being implemented. However, more progress needs to 
be made to enhance the cross-border integration in markets for retail financial services. 
Actions taken: The Commission has opened an inquiry into the stance of competition in retail banking and has 
launched a consultation on the functioning of the EU mortgage market, looking for ways to strengthen competition 
and raise efficiency. 
 
Source: OECD (2006). 
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Table C 
The Score Board of Structural Reforms 
 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
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Table D  
The Flexicurity 
 
Flexicurity is a new way of looking at flexibility and security on the labour market. It sets out from the 
awareness that globalisation and technological progress are rapidly changing the needs of workers and enterprises. 
Companies are under increasing pressure to adapt and develop their products and services more quickly. If they 
want to stay in the market, they have to continuously adapt their production methods and their workforce. This is 
placing greater demands on business to help their workers acquire new skills. It is also placing greater demands on 
workers with regards to their ability and readiness for change 
At the same time, workers are aware that company restructurings no longer occur incidentally, but are 
becoming a fact of everyday life. Protection of the specific job they have may no longer be sufficient, and might 
indeed be counterproductive. In order to plan their lives and careers, workers need new kinds of security that help 
them remain in employment, and make it through all these changes. New securities must go beyond the specific job 
and ensure safe transitions into new employment. 
Flexicurity is an attempt to unite these two fundamental needs. Flexicurity promotes a combination of flexible 
labour markets and a high level of employment and income security and it is thus seen to be the answer to the EU's 
dilemma of how to maintain and improve competitiveness whilst preserving the European social model. Flexicurity 
can be defined, more precisely, as a policy strategy to enhance, at the same time and in a deliberate way, the 
flexibility of labour markets, work organisations and labour relations on the one hand, and security –employment 
security and income security – on the other. 
The flexicurity concept takes us from a job security mentality to an employment or employability security 
mentality. It is a policy approach geared less towards the protection of jobs, and more towards the protection of 
people. Encouraging flexible labour markets and ensuring high levels of security will only be effective if workers 
are given the means to adapt to change, to stay on the job market and make progress in their working life. For this 
reason, the flexicurity model also includes a strong emphasis on active labour market policies, and motivating 
livelong learning and training, improving customized support to jobseekers, supporting equal opportunities for all 
and equity between women and men. 
The basic principles behind the flexicurity approach are very much in line with the central elements of the EU 
strategy for growth and jobs. The revised Lisbon Strategy promotes an active response to the challenge of 
globalisation. Flexicurity relies on a high level of workforce training, another priority in the updated strategy. In 
particular, Guideline 21 of the Employment Guidelines stresses the need to promote flexibility combined with 
employment security and reduce labour market segmentation, having due regard to the role of the Social Partners. 
Each Member State has a specific labour market situation and culture. The European Commission is therefore 
not aiming for a one-size- fits-all "flexicurity recipe" for all Member States, but rather to establish "pathways" to be 
developed towards achieving more flexicurity. Pathways are sets of measures that can, if introduced in conjunction 
with each other, improve a country's performance in terms of flexicurity. Various pathways need to be designed, 
fitting to different national situations. Pathways should also recognise that flexicurity strategies require broad 
support from workers, business and other relevant actors in society. Pathways need to be balanced, taking into 
account the interest of insiders as well as outsiders on the labour market. They would also help to promote a 
climate of trust in which all the actors concerned accept responsibility for change. 
In June 2007, the Commission is presenting a Communication which is to provide major input to the 
development of the common principles. In preparation, the Commission is conducting a broad consultation 
involving Member States, parliamentarians, Trade Unions, business, NGO's and the general public. The 
consultation process was complemented by a major conference in Brussels on 20th April 2007. The 
Communication will be discussed in the Council of Ministers, which should allow them to adopt a set of common 
principles by the end of 2007.  
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/flex_meaning_en.htm 
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Figure A 
 
The European Economy: Macroeconomic Dynamics 
 
 
Panel A. The sources of Growth 
 
 
 
Panel D. Inflation: Headline & Core 
 
Panel E. Interest: Short & Long Term  Panel B. Dynamics  on Productivity of a Range of 
Countries, 1986-95 & 1996-2005 
 
 
Panel C. Trade Balance 
 
 
 
Panel F. Exchange Rate 
 
Source: IMF  (2007). 
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Figure B 
The European Economy: Dynamics of Some Structural Aspects 
Panel A. Productivity & Living Standard:  
GDP per worker & GDP per capita in a Range of Countries, 
1950-2005, in 2002 US$  converted at EKS PPPs 
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Panel B. Living Standard in a Range of Countries 
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Panel F. Exchange Rate Dynamics  
1 € = x US $ 
 
Panel E. Gaps of Growth 
GDP per capita levels and Growth rates, gap vis-à-vis the US 
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Panel G. Policy Mix in a Range of Countries 
More / Less Restrictive 
Data from: Panels A and D: AMECO (2007), Groningen (2007), OECD(2005) and Eurostat (2005). Panel B: Aghion, Cohen, and 
Pisani-Ferry (2006). Panel E: IMF (2007)  
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Figure C 
Productivity and Costs 
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Figure D 
The Economic Regulation: Elements and Dynamics  
Panel A: Product Market Regulations 
 
Panel B: Regulation in Labor  
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Source: Panels A to F: OECD (2007c and 2006); and Panel E: Rajan (2005). 
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Figure E 
The Economic Reforms 
Panel A. Product Regulation and Employment Rate: 
More Regulation  and Less Employment 
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Panel D. Dynamics of OECD Reforms by Sector: 
Depth of Different Reforms in Europe 
Source: IMF (2007). 
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Map A 
Employment Rate in the EU and the US 
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Sources: EC-DG Regional Policy (2006) and US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007). 